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Anthony Egan, S.J. {*}



From: Stimmen der Zeit, 6/2010, P. 363-376


    This is the original text of Fr. Anthony Egan S.J., whereas the German text has been adapted a bit to the German readership.


The climax of the recent Clint Eastwood-directed film Invictus depicts the victory in South Africa of the South African team in the 1995 Rugby World Cup. The important role played by President Nelson Mandela's presence at a game, held on 24 June 1995, is interpreted by both the film and the book by journalist John Carlin, on which it's based, as part of Mandela's overall strategy for promoting reconciliation in the newly-democratised South Africa {1}. Mandela's exuberant support for a predominantly white team (and a game that is popular mainly with the white minority), and the completely non-racial days of joyous celebration that followed the victory, boded well for the future.

This year South Africa hosts the Soccer World Cup. Preparations have been under way for the last few years to build up a world class sporting infrastructure for the 'beautiful game'. Despite some criticism of the expense incurred in renovating stadiums and building new road transport systems, almost all South Africans hope that it will be a success (though few honestly believe the national team has a chance of victory as in 1995).

But how has the South Africa of 1995, one year after freedom, changed over the last fifteen years? How might one assess the 'state of the nation' on the eve of the World Cup? The challenges that South Africa faces are interrelated, varied and complex. If I may use an image it is a bit like trying to solve a Rubik Cube - just as one line on a side of the cube is resolved, other sides get badly jumbled. The 'trick', one South Africa has yet to work out, is to manipulate the cube so that all sides fall into place together.



Let us start by considering the political achievement and lacunae in the new South Africa. As we shall see throughout this essay, everything that can be said is often contradictory.

Democracy, Dominance and Dissent

From a minimalist perspective (e.g. of Huntington, Schmitter and O'Donnell {2}) South Africa is a functional democracy that has successfully emerged from authoritarianism. It has had three basically free and fair post-liberation elections, maintains a multi-party system, with separation of government powers (Administration, Legislature and Judiciary) and adherence to a Constitution (modelled largely on Scandinavia and Germany) and one of the most liberal Bill of Rights in the world. A Constitutional Court, accessible to any citizen as final arbiter in a dispute that involves human rights or the constitution, is highly effective, well-respected and has not hesitated to rule against government agencies when it has deemed them to have overstepped their mark.

South Africa has a party list proportional representation (PR) electoral system. Voters in national and provincial elections vote for a party, not an individual. Parties draft lists in order of internal candidate popularity. The advantage of this is that voting is clear; the disadvantage is that parties have inordinate control over who goes to parliaments. The PR system was created in order to favour political diversity - smaller parties have greater chance getting a few seats than in the old Westminster 'first past the post' system pre-1994 {3}. This has certainly been the case in the three elections so far, but this has not led to the ruling African National Congress (ANC) ever getting less than 63% of the national vote.

The latter reality - the immense support the ANC enjoys in South Africa - has led to what is in effect a One Party Dominant (OPD) situation {4}. Despite discontent in some sectors of the country over ANC policy and vigorous internal party debates, the ANC is in effect hegemonic: what the ANC wants, the ANC largely gets. The only significant check on the ANC is the Constitutional Court. However, as in the United States, the judges of the court are appointed (for a fixed term) by a (strongly ANC-influenced) Judicial Services Commission. Though it hasn't happened yet - and indeed many ANC-leaning judges on the Court have courageously put their loyalties aside in the interests of interpreting the Constitution - it is a real concern that some time in the near future the Court may itself come under undue influence from the ruling party.

The ruling party has also consciously built up its ties with the economic elites, both old (white) and new (black). Economics, dominated as one expects in an OPD system by ANC policy, has favoured the elites and in turn helped to create what is sometimes called in ANC circles a 'patriotic bourgeoisie'. Many, including ANC supporters, see this close relationship as dangerous to both business and the integrity of the political process. Needed economic and social redress to repair the imbalances of apartheid are increasingly seen as serving a grand alliance of ruling party and 'ruling class'. Numerous cases of 'clashes of interests' over government tender processes - where tenders have been awarded to party supporters, family members of parliamentarians and ANC officials - has led to accusations of 'cronyism' and even corruption {5}.

The effect of this has been growing, but as yet still ineffective, dissent. Dissent comes from three sources: opposition parties, new social movements and within the ANC itself. Least effective in its protest are the opposition parties (notably the Democratic Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party, Independent Democrats and the Congress of the People [COPE]). Collectively representing around one third of seats in Parliament, often divided amongst themselves, the opposition are politically weak and often regarded by the ANC with what verges sometimes on scorn. Since many of these parties are regional in their focus or (rightly or wrongly) regarded as voices of minorities (whites, Coloured, Asian South Africans), their objections to ANC behaviour is regarded as at best obstructing the 'national democratic revolution', at worst the impotent indignation of 'whinging whites'.

More politically and socially challenging are the new, radical social movements emerging among the urban and rural poor over specific issues - antiretroviral (ARV) medicine roll-out (Treatment Action Committee), electricity provision (Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee), land reform (Landless Peoples' Movement) and privatisation (Anti-Privatisation Forum) {6}. Although these movements denounce the 'fat cats' in the ANC/Government, this has so far not led to any new political party of the left. The South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - the largest organised labour bloc in the country - have remained within their historic alliance with the ANC, despite growing criticism of ANC neoliberal economic policies.

The greatest challenge to the ANC since 1995 has come from within. The alliance with the SACP and COSATU has been tense. There have however been a number of shifts within the ANC. Mandela's presidency was characterised by goodwill and reconciliation. His successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) {7} was far more of a delivery-driven leader: efficiency and economic growth were his central themes - as was a growing personal authoritarianism and patrician attitude that alienated many within the ANC, particularly the Left but also significant sections of the 'business class' within the party who felt to varying degrees excluded from Mbeki's orbit. The dramatic fall of Mbeki and his allies in the ANC came at the ANC National Conference in December 2007, where not only Mbeki but almost all his close associates were voted out of office within the party by a majority bloc representing an alliance of populists, the poor and the Left, led by Jacob Zuma. Shortly afterwards, the new ANC leadership effectively fired Mbeki from the presidency of South Africa (using the party's right to recall any person on their parliamentary lists). In 2009, Jacob Zuma was convincingly elected President of South Africa in the wake of the third consecutive ANC victory at the polls {8}.

The effect of Zuma's twin victories remains to be seen. The immediate result of the 2007 unseating of Mbeki was the creation of a breakaway party, the Congress of the People. Essentially representing a more conservative wing of the ANC (many of them Mbeki supporters), COPE performed remarkably well for a new party in the 2009 election. Many observers say, however, that it may have reached its 'ceiling' of support. Short of forming an alliance with other parties, which may spell its doom (there is a strong popular sense that all opposition parties are unpatriotic and represent racist interests, a point the ANC does not exactly discourage among its supporters), it is also starting to show signs of the deep divisions typical of a party formed in reaction to something rather than with a clear vision.

Another speculation of observers is whether or when the Left (SACP/COSATU) will split off from the ANC. Despite populist overtures, the Zuma presidency remains committed to a capitalist programme. The Left often feels marginal to the processes - despite some of its leaders co-opted into government there are regular rumblings of grassroots discontent {9}. Yet, knowing that the ANC is likely to remain in office for the next 20 years, who would break out of an alliance with a political 'winner'?


Race, Reconciliation and Redress

Shortly after the 1995 World Cup the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) {10} began its hearings into atrocities and human rights violations during the apartheid era. Perpetrators were called upon to come forward and, on full disclosure of their actions (but with no requirement for regret or apology), they would receive pardon on condition that their actions were clearly politically motivated. Victims too came forward to present their testimonies. By the time the Final Report was presented, thousands had testified.

The goal of the TRC was ultimately to produce a common history of the struggle era. In this it was to a certain degree successful. Insofar as reconciling rival political factions and producing understanding between races it was a far from unqualified success. Some critics have recently argued that the failure to prosecute egregious human rights revelations has psychologically left many in South Africa trapped in a past that has not received significant closure. It also allowed crimes to go unpunished and created among some an attitude that, so long as one admitted what did pardons were permissible, even expected.

The TRC certainly did not resolve any of the problems around race that have been central to the history of modern South Africa. Although many in South Africa would see race as a function of social class - and indeed the higher up one is in the economic and social hierarchy the less race matters - race remains a key theme in politics and wider society. The vision of a truly non-racial society is confronted with the reality that historically economic and political power has been connected to the colour of one's skin. Mandela's vision, his courting of white people during his time in office, was an attempt to broker racial reconciliation. Fifteen years later his effort has produced mixed fruits.

There is certainly an official degree of integration - an open non-racial franchise, no restricted group areas, and a qualified commitment to equal opportunities (qualified, we shall see below, by mandatory Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action policies). There is also a much greater degree of social mixing, particularly among the middle and upper classes who share many common interests (sometimes in conflict with those of the poorer majority). Race identity has however become a major political issue.

There has been a rise of what might be called black Africanist identity politics, a politics that sees black Africans as the main players in South African public life. There is a strong reaction against the idea that whites, Coloureds [people of mixed race] and Asian South Africans are truly Africans {11}. Tied to this is a tendency to appeal to a nebulous 'African culture'[ of which there are many in South Africa] that frequently acts as a dialogue-stopper to trump any form of social criticism - black critics are seen as 'coconuts' [black on the outside, white inside!], white critics are (knowingly or unknowingly) racists! Even a party like the ANC with a long history of commitment to an open and equal society is willing to play the 'race card' when they deem it necessary.

Such attitudes have been challenged by black and white critics alike. Many veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, have challenged this 're-racialised' discourse, as have a number of political theorists who see the notion of race and nationality as subtle, fluid and frequently socially constructed {12}. For the majority of South Africans, moreover, the matter can be seen largely as conflict over resources seen through a racial lens. Racist incidents have risen, as has xenophobia against foreign migrant workers and refugees from other parts of the continent, many of whom are better educated and better able than locals to enter the job market.



Just as a few wrongs twists of our Rubik cube can lead to confusion rather than solution, so too should we see the social state of South Africa not so much in isolation as in direct relation to its politics - and vice versa. Here too, there are many sides to the country's problems.

Education and Economy

Education and the economy are almost umbilically linked. Aimed at producing an obedient, servile and largely underskilled workforce for white rule, apartheid education's effects remain with us. Most teachers in black schools are themselves products of the system. The revolts against apartheid education that began in June 1976 and continued off and on until liberation in 1994 {13} have produced a 'lost generation' of youth with meagre education, few skills and little prospect of entering the new, globalised South African economy.

To their credit, the ANC from the beginning has prioritised education and skills development, making it the largest single item in successive Budgets. Yet despite this education remains for the most part abysmal, failing a new generation of 'born free kids'. It is broadly agreed - even by the ANC - that the new system has failed to produce sufficient literate and numerate youth to fill the job market {14}.

What has happened? Filled with an idealism of 'never again', education policymakers resolutely turned their backs on authoritarianism and rote-learning and instituted in the late 1990s a system of Outcomes Based Education (OBE) modelled largely on New Zealand and Canada {15}. However this system has proved unworkable for a number of reasons. First, it is posited on classes of 20 learners, each with 2 teachers and a fully functional school library/resource centre. In reality classes number 60 learners and one teacher often with a meagre or non-existent library. Second, the government has had to use apartheid education-trained teachers, many of them under-qualified, demoralised, resistant to change and sometimes prone to absenteeism and in some cases abusing alcohol in school hours. Third, teachers unions are powerful and highly protective of their members. Fourth, there is a shortage of well-qualified teachers in Mathematics, Sciences and English - the best go on to better-paid jobs in education administration or in business and industry. Clearly there is a need to maintain and upgrade existing teachers, to weed out the bad ones and develop a system that produces better results. Early in 2010, the Minister for Basic Education admitted that OBE has failed and that drastic revisions are needed. This is good news, not least for the economy.

The South African economy itself is highly complex and going through a variety of transitions {16}. From an agrarian and minerals base, it is starting (too slowly for some) to diversify and to become a player in the global market. On the surface, based on the conventional measurement instruments, it is a middle ranking economy. But this is itself highly deceptive.

A closer examination - using the Gini Coefficient to measure income disparities - reveals that South Africa is a land of extreme contrasts between rich and poor. The rich are very rich, the poor very poor, and the middle class (though growing) are relatively few. For most South Africans entry into the global economy has not been a source of well-being: the erosion of protectionism has led in many sectors to down-scaling and closure of factories, particularly in the face of cheap Asian imported goods. Poor education and limited skills have meant that South African workers have generally not been able to shift easily into new areas of work. Since 1995 the statistics, many of them not altogether reliable, have suggested a national unemployment rate of between 25-40%, despite an annual economic growth rate, with the exception of between 2000 and 2003, of between 4-5%. Poor education has created a skills shortage at almost every level even in the professions, since as a result of poor schools high university and tertiary education failure and drop-out rates have limited entry into them.

Added to this has been the policy of Affirmative Action (AA) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) {17}. Meant to shift the racialised demographic hold on economic power to one that more accurately represents the nation as a whole, its implementation has led to a number of problems. An employment quota system has had a series of unintended consequences: the legacy of apartheid plus poor post-apartheid education has created a small pool of black graduates, inadequate to both the needs of the professions and of the quota. The result has been the employment and rapid promotion of inexperienced people (sometimes over the heads of more experienced minorities). The upshot has been incidents of incompetence, embarrassing to the persons concerned and frustrating to companies and minority colleagues alike, many of whom feel they have to 'carry' inexperienced colleagues. The other upshot has been the employment of immigrants from other parts of Africa, which has added to existing xenophobic resentment.

The ANC wants 20-25% black ownership of the South African economy by 2020. The prospect of this is slim, short of nationalisation and redistribution of assets (unlikely if South Africa is to avoid massive capital flight). The BEE process - normally the buying of shares in existing white-run companies by black individuals and consortiums, often based on loans to the buyers made by the companies themselves - has been fairly uneven. Despite notable successes and the emergence of a new super-rich black elite {18}, often closely tied to the ANC, there have been many failures. BEE groups have invested in risky ventures that have subsequently failed through imprudent investment, being victims of shady dealers or simple mismanagement.

BEE and AA have many critics. Older established white-run companies have complained that public contracts awarded to these 'new' companies have led to mismanagement, waste and poor results. While this is certainly tied to resentment, in many cases it has been objectively true. Important public works have been botched; money has been wasted. More serious are the claims, made among others by Thabo Mbeki's brother Moeletsi, that BEE has created a culture of 'crony capitalism' and has not led to economic growth but the creation of a new, unproductive black capitalist class co-opted into living off existing enterprises {19}.

Another challenge to the economy has been the decline, often through mismanagement, of public resources necessary to economic growth. Bad planning by the national electricity provider ESKOM (going back, it should be noted, before 1994) has led to power shortages, power cuts, and loss of productivity in mines, industry and commerce. Though the prophets of doom warning of massive capital flight exaggerate, such infrastructural bungling (and the strength of the unions and progressive labour law) has made some foreign companies wary to invest.


Health, Welfare and Epidemics

Part of the ANC's agenda has been the admirable social democratic commitment to universal public health care and social welfare. Here too, though, noble desires and excellent policies on paper have not always translated well into practice {20}. The problems once again are the 'usual suspects', poor education and the economy. A plethora of new clinics - often in areas that had hitherto never seen a nurse or doctor - have been built. Poverty alleviation programmes and welfare benefits have been extended - a paradox in the present world where neoliberalism, which the ANC also endorses, has eroded much of the earlier social consensus. Yet state hospitals remain under-resourced (both in staffing and in medicines) and welfare benefits in many, mainly rural, areas do not get to the people who need them. Why?

Strictly speaking it is not that material resources aren't there - they are just not effectively managed. Logistics of delivery are poor because the administration of transfer is either tied up in bureaucratic red tape, or is lacking, or is being manipulated by corrupt officials for their own benefit. Staffing in public health is another problem: health care professionals are relatively poorly paid in the public compared to the private sector. Work conditions - shortages of resources, poor maintenance, and vulnerability to crime at work - have led many doctors to emigrate, citing poor working conditions and personal insecurity because of the nation's high crime rate. In some cases, doctors from minorities argue that AA obstructs their career advancement in the public health sector and rapidly move into private practice - or to Canada, New Zealand or Australia.

The worst aspect of the health and social welfare problem is HIV/AIDS {21}. South Africa has had one of the fasted rates of HIV infection and transmission in the world. While the problem is recognised, it has suffered serious delays in treatment. This is partly caused by perceptions that AIDS discourse is racist: that AIDS originated in Africa; that it was transferred from chimpanzees to humans (some see this as western insinuations of African bestiality); that the old colonial stereotype of sexually voracious and promiscuous blacks has been revived under a new 'scientific' guise. Some see it as caused by poverty - partly true, perhaps, if one notes that those at highest risk are often poor women who are dependent on their sexual partners for food and money. Others try to relativise the problem, seeing it as one of many chronic diseases Africa faces - partly true, too. A few, including former President Mbeki and two of his Health Ministers, have defended the 'AIDS sceptic' lobby, arguing that the connection between HIV and AIDS is not proven and that antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) have harmful side-effects and should therefore not be widely distributed in the public health system.

The good news is that these views have been thoroughly challenged both within and outside the ANC and Government. Sceptics like Mbeki have been taken to task by other public figures (including their old comrades like Nelson Mandela and AIDS activist and ANC member Zackie Achmat). The State has instituted massive ARV roll-out , hampered - as noted above - by administrative bungling. AIDS Awareness has become a major part of the public discourse. Though too soon to say, it is possible that the HIV infection rate is slowly dropping.


Crime and Corruption

South Africa has a partly true, partly exaggerated, reputation as one of the most dangerous countries on earth. Historically there has always been a problem of organised crime and gangsterism. While gangs have always been part of black township life - with the gangster an ambivalent figure, partly a social bandit and rebel against the apartheid system, partly a figure of fear and mistrust - the opening of South Africa to the world has led to new gangs from abroad (Chinese Triads, Russian Maffiya, Latin American drug cartels) moving in, often forming lucrative alliances with old established groups. Severe poverty motivates much of the petty crime, as well as domestic violence.

Policing has been difficult {22}. The old police were effectively paramilitary enforcers of the system, with wide powers of arrest, virtual carte blanche to shoot at will, and few restraints on using torture of suspects. Post-1994 policing policy has focused on their demilitarisation, on strict adherence to the rule of law, on restraint in the use of force. There have also been attempts to introduce modern scientific investigation methods, with mixed success. The Police Service itself has experienced a transformation that has not been easy, however necessary to redress their past misconduct. Advancement is perceived as linked to political connections. Inexperienced new officers have struggled, often valiantly, to keep the system working. Meanwhile the service has seen significant losses - police resigning over stress or frustration over promotion; suicides; and, significantly, officers killed in action at a rate comparable, some argue, to countries experiencing civil war. Poor salaries have also kept talented professionals from joining the Service.

The Police and nation face, too, some of the highest incidents of violent crime in the world. Crime statistics are unreliable - sometimes seen as a political ploy by the state to put a 'cap' on public fear, which it should be added crosses race, class and political boundaries. Recently, under Jacob Zuma, the earlier ANC approach to the problem - call fears exaggerated and blame public complaints on whites disaffected by post-apartheid society - has changed. Government now recognises that we really have a problem; what to do about it remains hotly disputed. What remains is a broad sense that crime is out of control, that the judicial system is creaking under the load and, most disturbingly of all for those who desire positive change, that elements of the Police Service are themselves corrupt.

This sense of corruption in the police is merely a reflection of a growing perception that many levels of society, government and public services are corrupt. The Corruption Perception Index, an annual survey of the reputable Transparency International, has reflected this decline in public trust: in 1995 the CPI placed South Africa in the top 20-30 least corrupt countries; in 2008 this had slipped to 55th {23}. While far from the bottom of the list, this decline - if the CPI is accurate - is disturbing, not least because South Africa's government and private sector have developed anti-corruption and good governance programmes. Once again one sees the tragic combination of good intention and poor delivery against a background of growing economic disparity between the rich and poor.



The last 15 years has been tricky for South Africa. Public policy while generally well-intended has often been poorly implemented, only partly as a legacy of the apartheid past from which we have emerged. The 'Rubik Cube Effect' has characterised much of the phenomena I've fairly superficially described: a move in one area towards, for example, greater equality has resurfaced residual racism and resentment. Attempts to redress wrongs of the past and to make business and the professions more demographically representative has led to problems of efficiency. The middle class has grown significantly, with the emergence of a strong black professional group, but the poverty gap has also widened.

How does your average South African see things? Despite the fact that crime and the spectre of unemployment in an unevenly developing economy generates uncertainty, despite the problems in education, social services and the public sector, a recent study suggests that a narrow majority of South Africans are basically optimistic {24}. Political analysts may worry about the dominance of the ANC (some even from within the ANC camp, who fear it may lead to complacency, arrogance, corruption and the betrayal of its founding democratic ideals), but very few South Africans of any race apart from a small dying breed of hardcore racists regard the apartheid past with nostalgia. Contrary to the doomsayers South Africa has not declined into civil war and become a failed state.

In a sense South Africa is a social experiment, perhaps the last great social experiment of the modern nation state. Like the average person trying to solve the Rubik Cube, it has been and remains a frustrating process of trial and error, trying to get a variety of social problems that affect each other into alignment. Frustration, false starts and failures are part of the process. What is essential is perseverance, critical boldness and a willingness to take a chance that a normalised society is possible. It is the willingness to take a chance that Nelson Mandela so heroically took in backing a mostly white team playing against the odds in a sport that was once a symbol of white supremacist machismo.

And remember how we did then.


    {*} ANTHONY EGAN is a South Africa Jesuit working at the Jesuit Institute - South Africa in Johannesburg. A historian and ethicist by training (PhD, University of Witwatersrand 2000) he has written a number of articles on church-state matters, ethics of war, and South African history.



{1} John Carlin, Invictus: Nelson Mandela and the Game That Made a Nation (London: Penguin, 2009) (2008).

{2} Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); Philippe C Schmitter, Guillermo O'Donnell & Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

{3} Bertha Chiroro, Electoral System and Accountability: Options for Electoral Reform in South Africa (Policy Paper 3; Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008).

{4} Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins (eds.), The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1999).

{5} Indeed, the author has heard such misgivings from one or two senior ANC members he has met.

{6} Richard Ballard, Adam Habib & Imraan Valoodia (eds.), Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post- Apartheid South Africa, (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2006).

{7} Essential reading here is: Mark Gevisser, The Dream Deferred: Thabo Mbeki (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007) and William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (London: Zed Books, 2007).

{8} See: Xolela Mangcu, To the Brink: The State of Democracy in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2008); Roger Southall & John Daniel (eds.) Zunami! The 2009 South African Election (Johannesburg: Jacana Media/ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009); Somadela Fikeni, 'The Polokwane moment and South Africa's democracy at the crossroads', in Peter Kagwanja & Kwandiwe Kondlo (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2008 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2009), pp. 3-34.

{9} Peter Kagwanja, 'Introduction: Uncertain democracy - elite fragmentation and the disintegration of the 'nationalist consensus' in South Africa', State of the Nation: South Africa 2008, pp. xv-l.

{10} Terry Bell & Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth (London: Verso, 2003); Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2000); James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (eds.), Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2002).

{11} Adrian Hadland, "'I am an African' - but you are not", Cape Times 16 October 2007, p.9.

{12} Ivor Chipkin, Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy and the Identity of 'The People', (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007).

{13} Peter Kallaway, History of Education under Apartheid 1948-1994 (Cape Town: Pearson, 2002).

{14} Linda Chisholm, 'South Africa's new education system: great intentions - harsh realities', in: Gorm Gunnarson, Patrick MacManus, Morten Nielson & Hans Erik Stolten (eds.), At the end of the rainbow? Social identity and welfare state in the new South Africa (Copenhagen: Southern Africa Contact, 2006), pp. 143-152; Jonathan D Jansen, Knowledge in the Blood: Confronting Race and the Apartheid Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 198-200, et passim.

{15} For a detailed account of policy development till 2000, see: Linda Chisholm, Shireen Motala & Salim Vally (eds.), South African Education Policy Review 1993-2000 (Johannesburg: Heinemann, 2003); Linda Chisholm (ed.), Changing Class: Education and Social Change in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Cape Town & London: HSRC Press/Zed Books, 2004).

{16} Sampie Terreblanche, A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002); Ibid, 'The developmental state in South Africa: the difficult road ahead', State of the Nation: South Africa 2008, pp.107-130.

{17} Roger Southall, 'Ten Propositions about Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa', Review of African Political Economy 111 (2006), pp.67-84.

{18} See, for example: Anthony Butler, Cyril Ramaphosa (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008).

{19} Moeletsi Mbeki, Architects of Poverty: Why Africa's Capitalism Needs Changing (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2009); Rebecca Harrison, 'Moeletsi Mbeki: Black Empowerment has failed', Mail & Guardian June 19, 2009.

{20} Anthony Butler, Contemporary South Africa (2nd edition) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 84-109.

{21} Pieter Fourie, The Political management of HIV and AIDS in South Africa: One burden too many? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); UNAIDS, Epidemiological Factsheet on HIV/AIDS: South Africa (New York: United Nations Program on HIV and AIDS, 2008).

{22} Antony Altbeker, The Dirty Work of Democracy (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2005); Monique Marks, Transforming the Robocops: Changing Police in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu Natal Press,2005); Gavin Cawthra, Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from Apartheid (London: Zed Books,1993); Ibid., Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defense, Development and Security in Transition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

{23} See details on the Transparency International Website:

{24} Fairuz Gaibie & Yul Derek Davids, "Quality of Life Among South Africans", Paper presented at the 4th ISQOLS Conference on Quality of Life, Florence Italy 19-23 July 2009.


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